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MISREADING THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN
TRADITION AND THE LAW:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SMOLIN
Samuel W. Calhoun*
Professor Martin Marty, in discussing the religious dimensions of
American constitutionalism (which he defines as "'the constitutional
thought of the founding period' ",1), argues that two quite different religious traditions had pivotal roles.' The first-Enlightenment philosophy--came to have dominance with respect to the formal ordering of
society," perhaps best exemplified by the text of the Constitution, which
Marty says "is described best and simply as godless." 5 The second-Biblical faith-operated chiefly in the " 'subterranean' dimensions," 6 where it contributed vitally "to the motivating, interpreting,
'7
and ordering of republican life."

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This article
was made possible by a grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center..I am grateful for the help of
Denis Brion, Mark Grunewald, and Tod Melton.
1. Marty, On a Medial Moraine: Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism, 39
EMORY L.J. 9, 12 (1990) (quoting 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 473 (L.
Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986)).
2. Id. at 10.
3. While it might seem odd to refer to Enlightenment philosophy as a religion, Professor
Marty relies upon Sidney Mead's assertion that the Enlightenment was "'the religion of the Republic.'" Id. at II (quoting S. MEAD, THE NATION WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH 118 (1975)).
4. Id. at 11-12.
5. Id. at 13.
6. Id. at 15; see also id. at 13-14.
7. Id. at 17.
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. Because of these contributions, 8 most of the Framers, despite their
desire'that the Constitution be godless, also thought it desirable that
the people themselves be godly.9 Rather than attempting to coerce godliness, however, the Framers' "great innovation . . .was to render the
possible contributions of particular sects and of biblical faith in general
entirely voluntary."'0 Faith must "make its way through persuasion,
for.which 'free exercise' of religion was vital.""
Despite the fact that the "churches by and large accepted the persuasive or voluntary, approach,"' 2 Professor Marty points out that
"[tioday there are frequent. expressions of discontent. . . .. Many concerned citizens, disturbed over what they perceive to be the moral anarchy resulting from pluralism, would like to see the nation more homogenized.""3 Some argue, that the Biblical tradition should be "somehow
privileged (though not uniquely established). '1 4 This view appears "in
a 'Christian Reconstructionist' movement, in some legislative and judicial attacks on 'secular humanism' as a threat to Judeo-Christian faith
and civilization, and more often in generalized rhetorical appeals which
do not issue in specific legislative proposals."' 5
Professor. David Smolin'.s article, The Judeo-Christian Tradition
and Self-Censorship in Legal Discourse, 6 is a vivid example of the
sentiment that Professor Marty describes. Initially, Professor Smolin
states his purpose as "an attempt to demonstrate the necessity and legitimacy of discussing God, and the Judeo-Christian tradition, in
American legal discourse."" He soon reveals, however, that his goal is
quite different. Rather than merely seeking to establish the legitimacy
of the Judeo-Christian tradition as a topic of discussion, he attempts to
show the "authoritative nature" of that tradition in American legal dis-

8. According to Professor Marty, the Framers believed that Biblical faith (1) promoted
"[c]ivic virtue in support of [the] rule of law," (2) provided collateral support for republican
ideas, as the "Baptist ... interest in 'soul liberty' " did for the Enlightenment doctrine of liberty,
(3) supplied the basis for a "dimensionally profound" interpretation of "the ordered life of a
constitutional republic," e.g., "the language of covenant and responsibility, of obedience to God,
the giver of liberty and the supporter of government," and (4) served as "'the binding tie of
cohesive sentiment' that [is] '[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society.' " Id. at 15-16 (quoting
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1939)).
9. Id. at. 17.
10. Id.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 1i8-19: While I agree with Professor Marty with respect to matters of religious
worship, examples in the area of conduct show that the church did not totally renounce the use of
state coercion. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
Marty, supra note 1,at 19.
13.-.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 13 U. DAYTON L: REV. 345 (1988).
17. Id. at 346.
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course.18 Professor Smolin believes that recognizing this authority in
the realm of law is the proper way to combat the "lost sense of values"
that permeates our culture.19
An initial difficulty in evaluating Professor Smolin's article is determining what he means when he speaks of "the authoritative nature
of the Judeo-Christian tradition."2 The phrase might mean something
consistent with Professor Marty's contention that the Judeo-Christian
tradition constitutes an important underpinning for our legal system.
The words, however, more naturally suggest something much more active and chilling-that Judeo-Christian precepts should be enacted into
law and thereby imposed upon all citizens, believer and nonbeliever
alike.
This is not to say that Professor Smolin would interfere with freedom of worship. He explicitly denies this intent." Much of Professor
Smolin's language, however, just as explicitly reveals that he isurging
an American legal system which would be, to a substantial degree, theocratic. He refers to applying "Christian norms in our legal system," 2
to "an America governed under religious . . . principles,' '2 3 and to laws
' Such
that reflect "the religious faith of the majority."24
phrases might
possibly mean something other than the meaning I attribute to them in
this article, but this evaluation of Professor Smolin's ideas presupposes
25
that my understanding is accurate.

18. Id. at 347.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 411-12.
22. Id. at 363.
23. Id. at 413.
24. Id. at 414.
25. Professor Smolin's article contains what he calls a "warning" which might be thought to
show that I have mistaken his meaning. He states:
[T]he acknowledgment of Christianity, as true and good, and of God and His revelation as
the source of objective norms, would not itself avoid the difficult question of which true and
good norms ought to be enforced through the particular mechanism of state-enforced
law. . . . Clearly, not all objectively valid norms derivable from scripture can or should be
enforced through law.
Id. at 367. This disclaimer does not persuade me to revise the opinion I have expressed. First, the
statement that not all Scriptural norms "can or should be enforced through law" is not reassuring.
This could refer to nothing more than the obvious point that many Biblical principles, such as the
command not to covet, Exodus 20:17, are beyond the reach of man's law. Second, the overall
tenor of Professor Smolin's article convinces me that theocracy is not a mischaracterization of his
vision for America. In addition to the phrases quoted in the text, Professor Smolin refers to "the
destructive and self-contradictory nature of reason and practice that denies the existence and governance of God." Smolin, supra note 16, at 365. He also states that "the"proper use of the JudeoChristian tradition in legal discourse would radically alter the current state of such discourse." Id.
at 367. Finally, one of Professor Smolin's principal reasons for arguing that the Judeo-Christian
tradition should be authoritative in legal discourse demonstrates that he in fact is arguing for a

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15:3

The purpose of this'article is to demonstrate that Professor Smolin's concept of the appropriate role of the Judeo-Christian tradition in
American law is misguided. This article is not written with any hostil28
ity to that tradition. Like Professor Smolin, I profess a belief in Re27 I therefore can appreciate the strength of his
formed Christianity.
convictions and his boldness in openly premising his argument in his
personal faith. I also empathize with the grave concerns he has about
the state of American society. Nonetheless, I believe the path that Professor Smolin prescribes is the wrong path. I am especially compelled
to write this response because of his statements to the effect that Christians who do not share his views have been captivated by a non-Christian world view. 2 8
I.

PROFESSOR SMOLIN'S THESIS

The principal reason that Professor Smolin gives for acknowledging "the authoritative nature of the Judeo-Christian tradition in American legal discourse" 9 is to avoid tyranny. His first argument is theoretical: he asserts that a relativist system, i.e., a system not based on
30
objective values, is "inherently tyrannical." Professor Smolin's second
argument states that "relativism . . . is not only tyrannical in principle,
but . . . has produced, and is producing, real subjugation of actual per31
sons in the specific context of twentieth-century American life." The
following is a summary of Professor Smolin's arguments.
A.

Relativism Is Tyrannical in Theory

Professor Smolin's theoretical argument is presented by asking the
reader to examine the position of persons or groups who lose particular
conflicts within a society, "whether it be a conflict over goods and ser32
vices, or a conflict concerning value choices." Professor Smolin would
characterize each loss as "a loss of freedom; the individual's or group's
will has been frustrated."3 3 If, however, prior consent to the rules for
resolving conflicts has been given, "[t]he reply to the loser is that his or
her loss is not an act of tyranny or domination because he or she at

theocracy. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
26. Smolin, supra note 16, at 363, 411.
27. I thus share Professor Smolin's view that Christian norms "are in fact true and good."
Id. at 362.
28. Id. at 362, 416.
29. Id. at 347.
30. Id. at 347, 359.
31. Id. at 362.
32. Id. at 350.
33. Id.
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some earlier time had freely consented to be bound by such rules." 4
The problem, Professor Smolin posits, is that consent is "contaminated by the circumstances of its procurement."3 5 The idea, for example, "that America has a social compact to which all have consented
. . . cannot be taken too literally" because (1) the Constitution "was
ratified and made binding over all Americans despite substantial and
fervent opposition," and (2) "subsequent generations were bound, so
that our system creates the tyranny of one generation over all subsequent generations." 3 Professor Smolin argues further that the "very
concept of consent" is attended by "uncertainties, psychological and
philosophical."3 " He writes:
The value of a theory of consent is that it posits free acts, rather than
forced acts, as the ultimate basis of conflict resolution. Yet many clearly
believe persuasion to be merely the most insidious form of domination:
that of one mind over another. . . . Arguably, anytime we "agree" with
another human being, that person has, through force of will, personality,
38
or intellect, dominated us.
The absence of consent to the rules for resolving conflicts means
that the loser can always claim that enforcement, "against his or her
will, constituted an act of tyranny."3 9 The loser has "in one way or
another been dominated and defeated through the force and will of the
rulers and winners.""0 A legal system based on objective values, however, is quite different. Here, one "can say to the loser: It was right
that you lost. I, the ruler, I, the winner, have not defeated you, but
rather this true moral principle, which objectively rules us both, has
determined that you shall lose this particular conflict." 4' 1
B.

Relativism Is Tyrannical in Practice

To bolster his theoretical argument regarding the tyrannical nature of relativism, Professor Smolin discusses two acts of tyranny which
it has produced during "its relatively short period of dominance as a
mode of legal discourse."' 42 The first is "the displacement in our legal

34. Id. at 353.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 354.
37. Id. at 355.
38. Id. at 355-56.
39. See id. at 353.
40. Id. at 359.
41. Id. at 359-60; see id. at 361-62. Professor Smolin makes it clear that he would look to
the Judeo-Christian tradition as the source for these ruling objective norms. See id. at 362. Professor Smolin's desire to grant coercive power to Judeo-Christian precepts inescapably demonstrates
that what he really has in mind is a theocracy. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
42. Smolin, supra note 16, at 365.
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system of the mode of thought dominant throughout our history with a
'
mode of thought dominant among a minority class of intellectuals."
The second is "the legalization of the killing of the unborn.""
1. History
Professor Smolin's first empirical example of tyranny is premised
in his view of American history: "given the historical and cultural centrality of the Judeo-Christian tradition and the supposedly democratic
nature of our institutions, it is tyrannical for an elite group of intellectuals who hold disproportionate power to banish serious discussion and
' 5
use of that tradition from legal discourse."
To substantiate his historical claim, Professor Smolin first discusses. the contribution of Puritanism to the American Revolution. The
original New England concept of a people in covenant with God"" was
spread throughout the colonies by such events- as the Great Awakening." This was critical to the people's embrace during the Revolutionary period of Lockean principles concerning duties and rights: these
ideas "were accepted and utilized because they coincided with the experience of the religiously motivated colonists in constructing and
"the people fought the
maintaining a Christian polity.' 48 In short,
9
Christianity.'4
Revolution for Protestant
Professor Smolin argues that "the covenantial view of American
50
history" continued throughout the nineteenth century. He describes
this century as characterized by "a kind of millennial nationalism," as
Christian Evangelicals "labored to bring about their dream of America
as the apex of Christian civilization." 5 1 The Civil War was the test of
"America's covenant with God." 5 Abraham Lincoln, in such speeches
as the Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugural, "restated . . .
the Puritan and Evangelical theme of America as a redeemer nation,
chosen by God to fulfill a special role in history"-to promote "realization of the principles contained in the Declaration of Independence, in

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 368.
47. Id. at 376-77 & n.82. The Great Awakening refers to a spiritual revival which took
place during the 1730s and 40s. Id. at 375. This movement was a "revival of Reformed, Calvinistic Christianity." Id.
48. Id. at 378; see also id. at 368, 377.
49. Id. at 380.
50. Id. at 384 n.104. This was true even though Puritanism itself had fallen from a position
of dominance to that of being "just one component of a broader vision of a Christian America."
Id. at 381-82.
51. Id. at 382.
52. Id. at 380..
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particular the principles of equality and inalienable rights." 5 3

The twentieth century, according to Professor Smolin, presents an
anomaly. On the one hand, the reliance by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
upon "Christian premises and imagery" demonstrates that Lincoln's re-

ligious premises retain vitality. 4 This is corroborated by recent polls
showing "that Americans as a whole remain highly theistic in their
beliefs."155 Strangely, however, our society presents an "appearance of
secularization." 5 6 Professor Smolin believes that this dichotomy results
from a "cultural gap" between the American people and the "intellectual elite," the so-called New Class.57 A "disproportionate percentage"
of the latter, "particularly in the areas of higher education and mass
communications-are hostile or indifferent to traditional theism."5 8
These intellectuals, "[a]s propagators of cultural symbols," view the
Judeo-Christian tradition as an obstacle to their power to shape society.5 Some have consequently found it desirable "to ridicule, distort,
ignore, and subdue theism's place in the hearts and minds of the people." 60 With respect to legal discourse in particular, Professor Smolin
believes that New Class scholars have been engaged in "a silencing or
censorship" of the Judeo-Christian tradition by a "general denial" of
the tradition's legitimacy and by excluding adherents of the tradition
from American law faculties. 6 '
2.

Abortion

Professor Smolin's second example of an act of tyranny resulting
from legal relativism is the legalized killing of the unborn. 62 Professor
Smolin is not surprised at this development. Once the Judeo-Christian
concept of freedom and equality is replaced by "indeterminate, subjective conceptions of those terms," continuation of "Lincoln's march" toward those ideals is "likely to produce institutions as abominable as
those, such as slavery, that the project was initially created specifically
to avoid." 63 Mass abortion on demand, defended now by some even assuming the full humanness of the fetus, 4 is "the great crime against
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
Christian
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 384.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 390.
Id. Business elites, who also stand to gain "from the displacement of traditional Judeovalues and symbols," have joined in the effort. Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 400.
See id. at 405-06.
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65
humanity of the relativist, liberal establishment."

II.

CRITIQUE

Professor Smolin's Theoretical Argument Is Not Persuasive
Professor Smolin's theoretical argument concerning the tyrannical
nature of relativism has two principal flaws. The first is his conclusion
that it is impossible to give legitimacy to conflict-resolution rules
through consent. The second is his view that a legal system based upon
objective values avoids tyranny because it is the objective values themselves, rather than any human beings, that do the actual ruling.
A.

1. Consent Can Legitimate a Legal System
Professor Smolin's argument that consent cannot legitimate a legal
system is at odds with a key element of our heritage as Americans-that the "consent of the governed" is the basis for legitimate
government. 6 Professor Smolin asks, however, if Americans have truly
given their consent.6 7 The question prompts the following inquiry: in
what way do citizens give their consent to abide by majority decisions
of the legislative bodies whose laws affect their lives? No one asks for
an agreement when citizens turn eighteen. Are Americans thus the victims of tyranny each time they are subjected to a law with which they
disagree? The answer is no.
Americans have implicitly given their consent to the American
system in several different ways. They manifest consent inwardly by
agreeing mentally that the system is legitimate. They manifest consent
outwardly by freely conforming their conduct to laws with which they
might not agree. They also show consent through the electoral process.
If they do not vote, they arguably manifest consent to the system
through silent acquiescence. If they vote and their candidate loses, they
manifest consent by not engaging in rebellion."' Lastly, continuing to
65. Id. at 403.
66. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67. Professor Smolin presents this question initially through his argument that the Constitution itself was not accepted by all Americans at the time and that the founding generation exercised tyranny over subsequent generations. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. I believe
that the first point is negated by his quotation of Professor John Hart Ely's argument that the
" '
opponents of ratification accepted the legitimacy of the majority's verdict.' " Smolin, supra note
16, at 354 n.35 (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 6 (1980)). The second point is negated by the numerous ways in which subsequent generations implicitly show their consent to
rules which they did not initiate. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
68. There have, of course, been times in our history when this type of restraint was not
shown, most notably in the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. As stated by the
prominent Confederate General John B. Gordon, "[g]radually and naturally in [the] furnace of
sectional debate, sectional ballots were crystallized into sectional bullets; and both sides came at
last to the position formerly held by the great Troup of Georgia: 'The argument is exhausted; we
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live in the country arguably shows consent through acquiescence or rat-

ification. Therefore, even when the majority passes laws with which

some citizens disagree, those citizens have not been subjected to

tyranny."9

Professor Smolin, of course, argues that even if someone persuades
another to support the majority position, the one persuaded is still the
victim of tyranny in that he has been dominated by another person.7 °
While in extraordinary cases consent may be invalidated by domina-

tion,71 Professor Smolin's argument that these circumstances include
ordinary persuasion is an extreme view. What if, for example, Professor

Smolin's article convinces a reader that his vision for the role of the
Judeo-Christian tradition is correct? Few people would seriously contend that Professor Smolin had subjected the reader to tyranny by
72
dominating his will.

The conclusion is thus warranted that a legal system can obtain
legitimacy through consent. This is not to say, of course, that a system
which basically is legitimate may not on occasion evidence examples of
illegitimacy.7" It is also not argued here that consent guarantees that
stand to our guns.'" J. GORDON, REMINISCENCES OF THE CIVIL WAR 22-23 (1981).
69. 1 would give the same response to Professor Smolin's charge that I am subjected to
minority tyranny in the form of Supreme Court decisions. Smolin, supra note 16, at 351-52. Since
I have implicitly demonstrated my consent to the Constitution, which contemplates constitutional
adjudication by the Court, the Court's power over my life is not tyrannical. But see infra note 73
(discussing circumstances in which a Supreme Court decision is tyrannical).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
71. Examples in the law of contract include instances of duress and undue influence. See E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 267-71 (1982).
72. Elsewhere in his article Professor Smolin plainly demonstrates that he does not fully
mean what he says about the impossibility of consent. In discussing the impact of "causative social
factors" in determining behavior, Professor Smolin cautions that "human free agency" is an important factor as well. Smolin, supra note 16, at 393. To acknowledge the existence of "human
free agency" is to acknowledge the possibility of genuine consent.
73. As an example of tyranny by the majority, consider the state governments in the South
prior to the civil rights movement. As stated by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.:
A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to
vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. . . . Throughout Alabama all sorts of
devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters. . . . Can
any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured?

M.L.

KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 83 (1964).

As an example of minority tyranny, consider the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). I agree with Justice White that Roe erroneously held that there is in the
Constitution, as a fundamental liberty, the right to an abortion. See Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785-94 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
According to Justice White, "decisions that find in the Constitution principles or values that cannot fairly be read into that document usurp the people's authority, for such decisions represent
choices that the people have never made and that they cannot disavow through corrective legislation." Id. at 787. Since Roe was just such a decision, the Court there engaged "not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own, extraconstitutional value preferences." Id. at 794. Thus, Roe is the epitome of tyranny.
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4
any particular decision is actually true or correct in an absolute sense."
Consent, however, can defeat the allegation of tyranny.
2. A System Based upon Objective Values Does Not Preclude Tyranny Because Human Implementation Is Required

As discussed earlier, Professor Smolin argues that the losers in

conflicts occurring under objectively-based systems cannot complain

that they have been dominated by other humans. Rather, the "true
moral principle" determines the outcome.7 This reasoning ignores the
agreement on
way things happen in the real world. Even assuming
7
what the source of the governing principles should be, 1 a principle cannot rule (in the way that Professor Smolin uses that word) without
human implementation.7 7 The inevitable result is that some individual's
or group's interpretation of the principle, rather than the principle itself, becomes the ruler. Not infrequently, these interpretations will misconstrue, if not defile, the principle. Consequently, losers have been

just as much as would have occurred in a reladominated by humans
78
system.
tivistic

74. As a Christian, I believe that a decision, even if based upon consensus, is true or correct
in the absolute sense only to the extent that it conforms to God's will.
75. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Since the rule of principle precludes any
a
charge of tyranny, Professor Smolin believes that even non-Christians should happily embrace
system based upon Judeo-Christian traditions. See Smolin, supra note 16, at 361-62, 366.
76. Professor Smolin, in choosing the Judeo-Christian tradition as the proper source, necesSmolin
sarily rejects other religions. But see Smolin, supra note 16, at 413 & n.199 (Professor
the
evaluated
yet
not
has
he
that
states
time
same
the
at
but
included,
be
may
suggests that Islam
what
issue.). Adherents of the excluded religions presumably would have a different idea as to
such beobjective norms should rule. Professor Smolin, however, has no hesitation in subjecting
lievers to a Judeo-Christian system:
[TIhe final response to those of a culturally vulnerable religious faith is that they simply do
not have the right to demand that the majority faiths abandon their desire to live in a
society that reflects, in its laws and other public domains, the religious faith of the majority. The law has to reflect someone's value orientation; America has to mean something.
The most appropriate place from which to draw these values and meanings is from the
historically and culturally dominant beliefs of the people.
supra
Id. at 414. Given my earlier argument that our democratic political system is legitimate, see
notes 67-69 and accompanying text, it might be thought that I am compelled to agree with Professor Smolin. If only democratic theory were involved, I would in fact find it difficult to refute him.
As I will show later, however, I believe that inherent in Christianity itself is a principle of selfrestraint, which I call the non-imposition principle. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
The non-imposition principle forbids Christians from exercising what would otherwise be legitimate majoritarian power.
77. God's principles do rule, in the absolute sense, without human intervention. For example, Galatians 6:7-8 (New International Version (NIV)) warns mankind: "Do not be deceived:
God cannot be mocked. A man reaps what he sows. The one who sows to please his sinful nature,
from that nature will, reap destruction; the one who sows to please the Spirit, from the Spirit will
reap eternal life." Professor Smolin, however, speaks of the attempt to implement God's principles
through man-made law. This effort obviously requires man to take matters into his own hands.
78. Some may construe these thoughts as an indirect attack on the reliability of the primary
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This criticism of Professor Smolin's argument can be substantiated
from his own article. He advocates the rule of the Judeo-Christian tradition. What does this term mean? While Professor Smolin acknowledges that it "embraces a number of competing traditions," he concludes that the tradition contains a "common core . . . sufficient to
provide a common content and common methodology in regard to
American law." 7 9 This is difficult to accept because the term "JudeoChristian" speaks of two religious traditions-Judaism and Christianity-that are fundamentally inconsistent. Jesus claimed to be the Messiah"° and stated that faith in Him was the only path for sinful man to
be restored to a relationship with God. 81 The Jewish leaders of the day
believed that Jesus' claim constituted blasphemy.8 2 They also rejected
faith in Jesus as the path of salvation, instead seeking righteousness
before God by observing the law.8 3 The assumption that these two radically different perspectives would yield a common approach to law is
problematical.8 4 As conflicts inevitably arise, the more numerous Christians would presumably prevail, thereby belying Professor Smolin's notion of the rule of principle. 5
Even if one speaks only of the Christian tradition, the fallacy of
the idea that principle can rule unsullied by man is apparent. In view
of statements made elsewhere in his article, it is surprising that Professor Smolin concludes otherwise. He acknowledges man's frequent distortion of God's call: "[t]he voice of God is often misheard; deeds done
on His behalf are often merely reflections of human depravity." 86 In his
account of conflicting responses by Christians to the civil rights movement, Professor Smolin also demonstrates an awareness of the fact that

source of Jewish and Christian principles-the Bible. This is not the case. I believe the Bible to be
"God-breathed," 2 Timothy 3:16 (NIV), and its normative rules to be "perfect," "altogether
righteous," and "trustworthy." Psalms 19:7, :9 (NIV). Christians, however, acknowledge themselves to be sinners, a people who have fallen "short of the glory of God." Romans 3:23 (NIV).
Thus, even when we try earnestly to let God's principles rule in our lives, we can never be confident of total success. It is bad enough if the consequences of our failures are confined to the
spheres of our own lives. Under Professor Smolin's proposed legal system, those consequences
would be inflicted upon all of society.
79. Smolin, supra note 16, at 410-11.
80. Matthew 16:13-17, 26:63-64 (NIV).
81. John 3:16-18, 14:6 (NIV).
82. Matthew 26:65 (NIV).
83. Romans 9:30-10:4 (NIV).
84. For a discussion of the profound impact that acceptance of the Christian Gospel should
have upon one's attitude toward man's law, see Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to Professor Greenawalt, J. L. & RELIGION (accepted for publication, 1991).
85. For a discussion of why this dominance by the Christian majority would not be perfectly
appropriate in our democracy, see supra note 76.
86. Smolin, supra note 16, at 409.
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7
Christians can disagree about what Christianity requires. These two
examples aptly demonstrate that Professor Smolin's theoretical argument-basing a legal system upon objective values precludes tyranny-is misguided.

B. Professor Smolin's Empirical Examples Do Not Support His Argument That Laws Should Be Based upon the Judeo-Christian
Tradition
Neither of Professor Smolin's empirical examples supports his contention that the Judeo-Christian tradition should rule through law. His
argument that the tradition's rule is required to be faithful to our country's historically-dominant perspective is not persuasive. While there is
historical evidence for Professor Smolin's view, he fails to ask a critical
question: whether the use of law to implement faith-based precepts is
consistent with Christianity. Professor Smolin's argument based upon
the legalization of abortion also is not convincing.
1. Professor Smolin's Historical Argument Is Flawed
While Professor Smolin's conclusion that the American people
89
88
"fought the Revolution for Protestant Christianity" is too simplistic,
there can be no doubt that Christianity "substantially affected the
character and strength of the movement for independence from England." 90 What is less clear, however, is how this supports Professor
Smolin's thesis that Judeo-Christian precepts should be "authoritative"
in legal discourse.
As previously discussed, Professor Marty contends that with respect to the formal ordering of American society, the Framers believed
that Biblical faith should make its vital contribution through voluntary
channels. 9 1 Professor Marty's view is supported by Professor Donald
Lutz's explanation of why religion is explicitly mentioned only in the
87. Id. at 386. The civil rights movement is not the only time that Christians have been on
opposite sides of important social issues. It happened on the slavery question, with Christians
importantly involved both in the abolitionist movement, see infra text accompanying note 97, and
in the defense of slavery. See Stringfellow, A Scriptural View of Slavery, in SLAVERY DEFENDED
86 (E. McKitrick ed. 1963). More recently, Christians have appeared on opposing sides in the
abortion controversy.
88. Smolin, supra note 16, at 380.
89. There were many influences besides religion "at work on American political thought
during the founding era." Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21, 21 & n.l (1990). Even if one focuses upon religion alone, Professor
Smolin's statement cannot be substantiated. See infra note 90.
90. Fisher, Ideology, Religion, and the ConstitutionalProtection of PrivateProperty: 17601860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 90 (1990). Professor Fisher shows, however, that "the ways in which
[religious loyalties] intruded on politics defy generalization." Id. at 90-92.
91. Marty, supra note 1, at 17. See supra notes 1-Il and accompanying text.
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first part of our national covenant-the Declaration 9 2-but not in the
second part-the Constitution:
We are a religious people, and our relationship to nature's God is an
important part of what ties us together as a people. But because we comprise a diversity of sects, and because our concept of federal liberty requires that we not force individuals to be religious without their consent,
we can commit ourselves to religion only in a general way, and only as
part of the background to our politics. 93
The arguments of Professors Marty and Lutz suggest that Professor Smolin has misconstrued the tradition in which he wishes to stand:
the true American model is that Christian precepts be embraced voluntarily, not that they be imposed through law. The full historical record,
however, reveals that this thesis itself would be a simplification.
It is true that by the late eighteenth century there was widespread
rejection of state compulsion insofar as matters of religious worship
were concerned. 9' There is also, however, undeniable evidence that
state force in matters of faith was not eschewed altogether. Professor
William Fisher writes:
[I]n every colony, statutory and common law lent assistance to religious
belief or observance. Examples of such legal buttresses include the treatment of blasphemy as a crime, statutes forbidding work on Sundays, official thanksgiving and fast days, and the distribution of tax revenues to a
limited set of Protestant denominations. 95
Many of these examples of using law to promote religious concepts existed well into the nineteenth century.96 Moreover, those Christian
evangelicals who so radicalized the Northern abolitionist movement
had no hesitation in seeking to use law to carry out their duty to be
"God's instrument in establishing [a morally purified] society. ' 9 7
In view of this significant part of our American heritage, using
history tolreject Professor Smolin's view concerning the authoritativeness for law of the Judeo-Christian tradition is not a simple task. Professor Smolin himself, however, suggests one possibility. One can argue
that by this point in the twentieth century secularization has occurred
to such an extent that the old view of law as an embodiment of reli92.
93.
94.

Lutz, supra note 89, at 36.
Id. at 40.
An example is the 1786 Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom. See

THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY

(M. Peterson & R. Vaughan, eds. 1988).
95. Fisher, supra note 90, at 84-85.
96. See id. at 108-11; Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State,
39 EMORY L.J. 149, 157 (1990).
97. Fisher, supra note 90, at 126.
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gious premises" is now "part of American tradition the way that the
99
flat earth theory is a part of Western tradition." Professor Smolin
offers two pieces of evidence to rebut this charge: (1) Dr. King's reliance upon "Christian premises and imagery" during the civil rights
movement, 100 and (2) polls showing that Americans are still "highly

theistic." 101

The poll results are not as probative as Professor Smolin asserts.
Belief in God, in and of itself, suggests nothing about one's view of the
extent to which law should reflect religious precepts. Evaluation of Pro-

fessor Smolin's reliance upon Dr. King's Christianity is much more
complex.
Dr. King's Christian faith was undoubtedly indispensable to his
role in the civil rights movement. He viewed himself as God's instru10 2 which King bement to help establish God's kingdom here on earth,
0 3 King's faith not only
lieved to be the mission of true Christianity.
10
was a source of strength in harrowing situations, ' but also provided
the philosophical foundation for the method of nonviolent direct action
which was the hallmark of the movement.1 05 It would be incorrect,
however, to say that Dr. King was motivated solely by his desire to
implement Christian precepts. He also spoke with "eloquence and erudition about the promise of America and the aspiration of 'her citizens
1 06 King consistently premised
of color' to gain their full citizenship."
his call for racial justice on the twin pillars of God and the rights of an
American citizen. This was eloquently expressed in his Letter From
Birmingham Jail:
98. 1 do not suggest that this view of law was ever uniformly held in America, even among
Christians. An important example of a Christian who criticized many of the measures Professor
Fisher describes as "legal buttresses" of "religious belief or observance," Fisher, supra note 90 at
84-85, was the prominent Baptist preacher John Leland. See Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC'Y PROCEEDINGS 155 (1952).
99. Smolin, supra note 16, at 385.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 387.
102. See S. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND 73 (1982). Dr. King's self-concept recalls
that of the Christian evangelicals during the abolitionist movement. See supra text accompanying
note 97.
103. S. OATES, supra note 102, at 33. Dr. King believed that the Christian Gospel was
social as well as personal. In a meeting with city leaders during the Montgomery bus boycott, he
stated that " '[i]f one is truly devoted to the religion of Jesus he will seek to rid the earth of social
evils.' " Id. at 81.
104. See M.L. KING, JR., supra note 73, at 74-75 (describing his confinement in a Birmingham jail); S. OATES, supra note 102, at 86-89 (describing King's response to death threats).
105. See M.L. KING, JR., supra note 73, at 35, 87. While it was " 'the love ethic of Jesus'"
which supplied the "spirit" that Dr. King needed, it was from Gandhi that he learned the specific
method of "noncooperation with evil" which Dr. King viewed as "the only moral and practical
way for oppressed people to struggle against social injustice." S. OATES. supra note 102, at 32.
106. S. OATES, supra note 102, at 97.
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One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of
God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for
what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in
our Judeo-Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation back to those
great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding fathers in
their formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of
10
Independence. 7
The fact that Dr. King's inspiration had two sources demonstrates
that he does not provide clear-cut support for Professor Smolin's contention that the American tradition of granting authoritativeness in law
to Christian precepts is still extant. Assume, however, that Dr. King's
reliance upon our democratic institutions could be stripped away and
that he could accurately be viewed as one whose sole goal was to see
God's laws followed-a twentieth-century analogue of the nineteenthcentury American who sought laws to criminalize blasphemy. Professor
Smolin would say that such an assumption would substantiate his argument: we have a tradition of implementing Christianity through law
and we should return to it. Professor Smolin accuses Christians who
disagree with this prescription of having "been persuaded by the relativists."' 10 8 Professor Smolin does not consider an alternative explanation: that Christians may refrain from seeking to implement their faith
through law because they view such an effort as inconsistent with
Christianity.
I am such.a Christian. I believe that inherent in Christianity is the
principle that the faith should not be imposed upon others by force of
law. This non-imposition principle extends not only to belief, but also to
conduct. 10 9 Human coercion can play no role in another's decision to
become a Christian because that change can occur only through the
work of the Holy Spirit. 1 0 Similarly, with respect to conduct, it is only

107. M.L. KING, JR., supra note 73, at 94. The duality of Dr. King's motivation is incontrovertible. There are many other examples, including his electrifying speech to the initial mass
meeting during the Montgomery bus boycott, S. OATES, supra note 102, at 70-71, and his agreement with President Kennedy's statement that the civil rights struggle confronted Americans
" 'primarily with a moral issue . . .as old as the Scriptures and . . .as clear as the American
Constitution.' " M.L. KING, JR., supra note 73, at 32.
.108. Smolin, supra note 16, at 362; see also id. at 415.
109. At one point in his article, Professor Smolin says that the important question of what
objective norms should be enforced "through law should be answered in terms of what the JudeoChristian tradition itself says about the use, nature, and function of law." Id. at 367. While Professor Smolin purports to leave this evaluation to "another day," id., I have already stated my
opinion that his article promotes the idea of a theocracy. See supra text accompanying notes 2025. The non-imposition principle is the fruit of my own effort to answer the question which Professor Smolin poses. This principle is fully articulated and defended in another article. See Calhoun,
supra note 84.
110. See John 3:3-6 (NIV).
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God's power that can achieve "what God principally seeks-a people
who freely love him and demonstrate their love through obedience."'",

Using force to compel compliance with God's standards is harmful in
that it promotes other sin, creates hostility to the faith and perpetuates
righteous
that
the "cruel delusion," at odds with the Christian Gospel, 11
2
God.
with
relationship
restored
a
to
conduct is the road
The non-imposition principle obviously affects my evaluation of
the tradition proffered by Professor Smolin. Christians in the past were
wrong to the extent that they sought to impose their beliefs upon others
through law. This is not to condemn all political activity by Christians.
I criticize only such activity whose principal goal is to compel others to
live according to Biblical standards. If the Christian can in good faith
base his desire for a particular law on independent, secular grounds, he
does not violate the non-imposition principle. This is true even if the
law will at the same time implement a Christian precept.
How then would I evaluate Dr. King's actual-not assumed-posture? Since he had plainly-articulated and convincing secular justification for his goals, he did not act inconsistently with the nonimposition principle." 3 The fact that his pursuit of those goals undeniably was intensified by his Christian beliefs makes no difference. Dr.
King stands as a preeminent example of the Christian activist. He does
not, however, substantiate Professor Smolin's call for recognizing the
general authority in law of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Without the
constraint of the non-imposition principle, what Professor Smolin seeks

is incompatible with Christianity."

4

11l. Calhoun, supra note 84.
112. Id.
113. The same can be said of those Christian abolitionists who, in good faith, based their
attack on slavery upon secular as well as religious grounds. This dual justification would not have
been unusual. According to Professor John Thomas, the "pioneer abolitionists" argued:
[S]lavery was a sin and a crime, a sin because it denied to the Negro the status of a human
being, a crime because it violated the natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence. These two beliefs-in the spiritual equality of all believers and the political equality of all Americans-served as the chief
moral weapons in the attack on slavery.
Thomas, The Abolitionist Crusade, in SLAVERY ATTACKED I (J.Thomas ed. 1965). This abolitionist perspective plainly foreshadows the approach of Dr. King. See supra notes 102-07 and
accompanying text.
114. Professor Smolin's article contains language from which it might be argued that he
would agree with the non-imposition principle. In considering whether his desired use of the
Judeo-Christian tradition would violate the first amendment, Professor Smolin states:
Nearly every religious purpose, whether it be prohibiting abortion, promoting chastity, or
feeding the poor, can be separated from its religious roots and presented as a secular motivation. The use of 'religious motivation' as a criteria for judicial review is inherently problematic. Christians, for example, are exhorted to do everything 'in the name of the Lord
Jesus.' Does this require a court to invalidate every act of a legislature composed predominantly of believing Christians? How is a court to examine and characterize the motivation
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2. Legalized Abortion Does Not Support Professor Smolin's Call for
the Authoritativeness in Law of the Judeo-Christian Tradition
Professor Smolin cites legalized abortion as a second empirical example of tyranny produced by legal relativism. Since any secular ideology must be judged "in the light of the crimes [it] has committed and
defended," ' the relativist, liberal establishment's responsibility for legalized abortion " 6 demonstrates the need to restore the authoritative-

ness in law of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Evaluating Professor Smolin's conclusion requires several steps. One must first examine his
presupposition that legalized abortion is a crime. If it is, one must determine if the relativist, liberal establishment is to blame. If so, the
issue becomes whether the proper recourse is to restore the authority in
law of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Professor Smolin asks the reader simply to accept a key element in
his charge that legalized abortion is a "crime against humanity"" 7-that abortion should be viewed as "the taking of innocent
human life.""' Many supporters of legalized abortion undoubtedly
would contest this point. The issue cannot be fully explored here. Suffice it to say that convincing evidence exists to substantiate Professor
Smolin's view.' 1 9 What must be addressed, however, is his contention
that blame for the crime of legalized abortion can be laid at the feet of

liberalism.

20

Professor Smolin's conclusion is incorrect. This is not to

in the hearts of religious believers without impermissibly becoming entangled in religious
questions?
Smolin, supra note 16, at 409-10 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Colossians 3:17 (NIV)). This statement does not reassure me. Professor Smolin's argument relies upon the inappropriateness of a
court's examination of the believer's heart. The non-imposition principle requires each believer to
examine his own heart. Professor Smolin refers to religious purposes being "presentedas a secular
motivation." Id. at 410 (emphasis added). This phrase to me suggests disingenuousness on the
part of the believer. The non-imposition principle iequires the Christian, before seeking a law
which implements faith-based precepts, to genuinely believe that secular considerations provide
independent justification for the law.
115. Id. at 409.
116. Id. at 403.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 401.
119. The evidence includes the occurrence of live births during late second-trimester abortions, significant indications that fetuses experience pain as early as the end of the first trimester
and the indisputable genetic uniqueness of each human embryo from conception. See Calhoun,
supra note 84. I believe that many who do not view the unborn as human life have either negligently or willfully ignored this and other evidence which contradicts their view.
120. Smolin, supra note 16, at 403-05. 1 am aware that some have argued that a finding
that the fetus is a human life does not compel the conclusion that abortion on demand is a crime.
Professor Smolin, for example, discusses and rejects the position of Professor Laurence Tribe,
who, even assuming that "'pre-viable fetuses [are] full human beings,' " defends the woman's
right to abort. Id. at 405-06 (quoting L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352-59 (2d ed.
1988)). My purpose in this article does not require me to evaluate arguments like that of Profes-
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say that the current liberal establishment does not predominantly support legalized abortion. It does. Tragically, however, as Professor Smolin himself recognizes, these leaders are acting inconsistently with their
own liberal tradition:
There is a sense in which the pro-life cause would naturally fit the establishment liberal agenda, for the cause seeks to protect a group whose
members quite literally cannot protect themselves. Rarely before, moreover, has establishment liberalism been willing to carry the relativist
agenda to the point of allowing one human being to physically injure or
kill another; typically, the principle of relativism is halted at the point
when direct harm to an innocent other is contemplated. American liberalism could still repent of its broad-based allegiance to mass abortion on
demand, and recoup at least a good portion of its ideological
consistency."'
Rather than calling for general legal implementation of JudeoChristian precepts, thereby risking violation of the non-imposition principle, Christians should be working instead to help those liberals who
support abortion to realize that they are violating their own principles.12 2 This is not to imply that there are not many Christians who
need to experience a similar realization. In fact, Randall Terry,
founder of Operation Rescue, lays the blame for the continuation of
legalized abortion squarely upon Christian apathy. 2
Even those Christians who are active in the fight against legalized
abortion have no basis for moral smugness. If many liberals have a
blind spot on the abortion issue, Christians' 2 " in the past have had
blind spots on other issues, such as the civil rights movement. 2 5 Liberals played a part in calling Christians back to the Christian tradition.
Even though Professor Smolin believes that success is improbable, 2 6
sor Tribe. It is sufficient to say that I, with the exception of situations where the mother's life is
endangered by continuation of the pregnancy, find such arguments unconvincing.
121. Id. at 406; see id. at 402-03.
122. This effort by Christians would not violate the non-imposition principle, as there are
secular reasons for viewing the unborn as human life.
123. See R. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE 144-46, 156, 159-60, 172-73, 215 (1988). Some of
the apathy occurs among Biblically-conservative Protestants who should know better. Part, however, is attributable to the fall from orthodoxy of much of mainline Protestantism. This has many
significant components, but includes, as Professor Smolin states, the fact that the "institutional
leadership" of such churches have "placed virtually their entire moral capital behind the secular
agenda of left-wing political groups." Smolin, supra note 16, at 387. I believe, consistent with
Randall Terry's view, that what would most advance the fight against abortion would be the
fidelity of both groups, conservative and mainline Protestant alike, to what the historic faith
requires.
124. By speaking of "liberals" and "Christians," I do not mean to imply that liberals cannot
be Christians.
125. See Smolin, supra note 16, at 386.
126. Id. at 406.
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Christians should now attempt to reciprocate that important service.
Even if one accepts Professor Smolin's view that the liberal establishment is responsible for legalized abortion and his belief that any
reform is improbable, the conclusion that the Judeo-Christian tradition
should be authoritative in legal discourse is still unwarranted. According to the non-imposition principle, any across-the-board recognition of
such authoritativeness would be incompatible with Christianity.12 The
Christian, appropriately to invoke the power of the state, must be sure
that each law he seeks is supported by independent, secular grounds.
This requires a case-by-case evaluation. Giving blanket legal authoritativeness to the Judeo-Christian tradition precludes this essential
safeguard.
III. CONCLUSION

This article has argued that Professor Smolin has not substantiated his contention that the Judeo-Christian tradition should be authoritative in legal discourse. This conclusion necessarily affects my evaluation of the ringing call to action with which Professor Smolin ends his

article. Professor Smolin believes that "[t]oo many [Christian scholars]
have been content to relegate their faiths to their private lives, while
moving quietly and safely amongst their colleagues." 12 8 He calls us to
"the work--despite prejudice, despite opposition."' 2 9 He provides encouragement by reminding us that we are "on the winning side: the
victory will be accomplished by God in the time, and with the means,
that He has appointed."' 3 °
What I have argued, of course, is that God does not use man's law
as His means of victory.13 ' Therefore, the work of the Christian scholar
is not, as Professor Smolin urges, to seek legal authoritativeness for the

127. 1 am curious as to how Professor Smolin would react to this statement. I rely upon
what I believe to be an objective principle which binds all Christians. Professor Smolin, however,
presumably would argue that the non-imposition principle is not part of Christianity. See supra
note 25. If most Christians happened to agree with me, would Professor Smolin, as the loser in
this particular conflict, be willing to concede that I had not dominated him, but rather that he had
lost due to a "true moral principle, which objectively rules us both"? See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. I doubt it. He would more likely say that my view is a distortion of Christianity and that his loss was due to an imbalance of raw power. If I am correct in my assessment of
Professor Smolin's reaction, the scenario I posit is a further indication that he should repudiate his
argument that basing a legal system upon objective values precludes tyranny. See supra notes 8687 and accompanying text.
128. Smolin, supra note 16, at 415.
129. Id.
130. Id.at 416.
131. At one point in his article Professor Smolin seems to recognize this: "The Christian life
is a ceaseless struggle against the evil both within and without, but Christianity also teaches that
ultimate victory is not achievable in this world or life, and is not achieved through human autonomy but rather through divine sovereignty." Id. at 391.
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Judeo-Christian tradition. To the extent that Professor Smolin's criticism of Christian scholars reflects their failure to pursue his mistaken
vision, I cannot agree with.his critique. 132 I do, however, join Professor
Smolin in calling Christian scholars to "the work," albeit of a different
kind than his article encourages. The work I have in mind is the same
work required of everyone who is a disciple of Jesus. First, Christians
are called to an unabashed commitment to the Christian Gospel. 3 Underlying this emphasis is the basic truth that a transformed heart, not
legal compulsion, is the path to obedience to the way of life which God
commands. Second, Christians are called to lead a Christian lifestyle.1 3 " We cannot expect the world to take us seriously if our beliefs
are not reflected in the way we live.
The lesson for today's Christian scholar is clear. First, we must
obey Christ's command to be witnesses for the Gospel to our colleagues
and students. The academic environment can indeed, as Professor Smolin states, be indifferent or hostile to Christianity. Difficulties, however,
are no excuse for ignoring everyone's need for Jesus Christ.13 5 Second,
we must live a Christian life-style. This includes not only what might
be called inner-directed elements, such as pursuing personal holiness,
but also outer-directed ones: do our actions show forth the love of
Christ to the world? We must strive for this in our response to public
problems as well as in our personal relationships. Charles Colson argues that the former should involve us in efforts to bring "'the Christian mind' to today's political and social issues." 1 36 I agree, so long as
the Christian is faithful to the non-imposition principle. Colson, I believe, would not object to this constraint: "Christians must contend for
truth; not simply by quoting Scripture, which our secular neighbors
don't believe anyway, but by presenting persuasive arguments." '3 7
My different view of how Christian scholars' efforts should be directed does not mean in the end that I consider the Christian ethic any
less important for the American legal system than does Professor Smolin. I conclude by returning to Professor Marty's statement that the
Framers believed a godly people to be vital to the success of our repub-

132. 1 should state here that I consider myself very fortunate to be working at a law school
which not only does not exclude Christians from the faculty, but at which several of my Christian
colleagues definitely do not "relegate their faiths to their private lives." For Professor Smolin's
contrary observations, see supra text accompanying note 61.
133. See Matthew 10:32-33, 28:18-20 (NIV); Philippians 1:27-28 (NIV).
134. See Ephesians.4:1 (NIV); I Peter 1:14-16 (NIV).
135. The methodology for witnessing is a question beyond the scope of this article. I am
convinced, however, that it is possible to be a bold exponent of the Gospel without acting in an.
_ obnoxious or otherwise inappropriate manner.
136. C. COLSON, AGAINST THE NIGHT 164 (1989).
137. Id. at 167.
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lic.'3 8 The evidence that they held this belief is overwhelming. 13 9 As the
godliness of our people declines, many have expressed grave concern
over America's future. Professor Glenn Tinder worries that we may be
"now living on moral savings accumulated over.many centuries but no
longer being replenished." 140 Professor Harold Berman warns that John
Adams was right when he said that "the Constitution . . . 'was made
only for a moral and religious people. Itis wholly inadequate to the
government of any other.' "141 Charles Colson argues that "[tihe reigning god of relativism and the rampant egoism it fosters coarsen character, destroy any notion of community, weaken civility, promote intolerance, and threaten the disintegration of those very institutions
necessary to the survival and success of ordered liberty. 142
The warnings must be taken very seriously. A nation whose people
reject God faces inevitable decline." 3 The return to godliness, however,
cannot be based upon Professor Smolin's effort to empower Christian
precepts with the force of law. The path instead is the ancient path of
the disciple of Christ. "

138. See Marty, supra note 1, at 17.
139. Id. at 16-18.
140. Tinder, Can We Be Good Without God?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1989, at 69, 82.
141. Berman, supra note 96, at 163 (quoting 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 229 (1856)).
142. C. COLSON, supra note 136, at 108. Dr. Francis Schaeffer makes a similar point:
.Those of us from the Reformation countries have experienced a Christian consensus. (This
does not mean that every individual was a Christian but that society was strongly influenced by Christian values). But my generation and the generations immediately preceding
me made a bad choice, and so we now live in a post-Christian world. The choices of faith
have been set aside and forgotten, and, accordingly,.'the confusion, sorrow and lawlessness
* . * isoccurring in our generation.
F. SCHAEFFER, JOSHUA AND THE FLOW OF BIBLICAL HISTORY 211 (1975).
143. Many may find this idea quaint and amusing. My response is to state that we are even
now experiencing its tragic truth. Absent a renewed commitment to God, our descendants will
experience the decline even more intensely.
144. In describing the basic work of the Christian as a commitment to proclaiming the
Gospel and to living a Christian life-style, I am in agreement with Cha'rles Colson's call that the
church strive to be "communities of light exist[ing] . . . in accountable fellowships where the
gospel is faithfully proclaimed and where members reach out in an effort to bring God's mercy
and justice to those around them." C. COLSON, supra note 136, at 156. Mr. Colson in turn reflects
the Apostle Paul's letter to the church at Philippi: "Do everything without complaining or arguing, so that you may become blameless and pure, children of God without fault in a crooked and
depraved generation, in which you shine like stars in the universe, as you hold out the word of life
" Philippians 2:14-16 (NIV).

Published by eCommons, 1989

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss3/2

